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AVIC International a Success: How
Regulatory Changes to CFIUS Has
Limited Political Interference and
Empowered Chinese Investors to Obtain a
Successful Review
Amrietha Nellan*
Chinese businesses are wary of merging or acquiring United States
companies due to a perceived hostile regulatory environment. The
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) evaluates
mergers and acquisitions of U.S. businesses by foreign companies for
national security risks.
It may deny the transaction or make
recommendations to the President to divest a completed deal if a risk is
found. After a string of highly public failed CFIUS reviews against Chinese
acquirers, the process seemed insurmountable for Chinese investors.
However, the recent success of a Chinese aviation firm, AVIC International,
in acquiring a U.S. based aviation company, Teledyne Continental, indicates
that the United States is not an impenetrable market for Chinese investors.
In particular, AVIC International’s use of the informal prenotice review and
mitigation agreement with CFIUS minimized political interference during
the formal review and helped ensure a favorable outcome. This note
suggests that Chinese investors should follow AVIC International’s strategy
rather than being dissuaded from acquiring U.S. companies.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California Hastings College of the Law. Special thanks to
Hastings for putting on events like the China Town Hall, where I was first introduced to this
issue and inspired to write this note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession is widely seen as the worst economic crisis
since the Great Depression, and has left deep wounds in the
American economy. 1 Despite the official end to the recession in
2009, the United States is still recuperating from the millions of jobs
lost in the process. 2 The United States has reported positive
economic growth since 2010, 3 however, unemployment at the end of
2011 was 8.5 percent, which is over 3 percent the pre-recession
unemployment rate. 4 In order to create more jobs in the United
States, the country must stimulate greater economic growth. 5 One
key method of increasing growth is by attracting foreign direct
investment (“FDI”) into the United States. 6
The Obama administration has identified foreign investment as
an important element to the country’s road to recovery. 7 The
administration has actively welcomed FDI and has committed itself to
making the United States the most attractive place for investment. 8
In particular, FDI will help accelerate current growth rates while also
The
being the foundation for long-term economic growth. 9
administration has been successful at attracting foreign investment,
which declined during the recession from 2007 to 2009. 10 However,
the key to attracting significant amounts of FDI is attracting China to
invest in the United States.
China has the largest foreign exchange reserves of any country, 11

1. David B. Grusky, Bruce Western, & Christopher Wimer, The Great Recession,
RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, https://www.russellsage.org/publications/great-recession (last
visited Mar. 2, 2012).
2. Id.
3. Data: GDP growth (annual), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
4. Database, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
5. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Assessing Trends and Policies of Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION (July 2008),
http://trade.gov/publications/pdfs/fdi2008.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Mary Bruce, White House Touts Growing Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., ABC
NEWS BLOGS (Jun. 20, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/06/white-house-toutsgrowing-foreign-direct-investment-in-the-us/.
8. Bruce, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. See Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
11. China’s Foreign-Exchange Reserves Surge Exceeding $2 Trillion, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 15,
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=alZgI4B1lt3s.
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a large trade surplus, 12 and is currently the world’s second largest
economy. 13 However, China currently spends much less in outward
FDI compared to major developed countries. In 2010 China’s FDI
was 0.67 percent 14 of its GDP, while the major developed countries 15
on average spend over 2 percent 16 of their GDP on FDI. Moreover,
China’s FDI to the United States is significantly less than major
developed countries. In 2010 only 1.9 percent 17 of China’s FDI went
to the United States, while major developed countries directed more
than 10 percent 18 of its total FDI to the United States. This suggests
that not only will there be a significant increase in overall Chinese
foreign investment as China continues to develop, but that even more
so may be directed to the United States if China’s investment profile
becomes more like developed countries. This huge source of
potential investment could very well accelerate growth in the U.S. to
the level necessary to bring down unemployment, 19 but this
investment is not guaranteed. 20
Obviously, the investment from China is not guaranteed for
many reasons but one major reason is the belief among Chinese
investors that the United States is a difficult place to invest due to
political hostility. 21 In particular Chinese investors point to CFIUS on
Foreign Investment in the United States’ (“CFIUS”) history of
thwarting Chinese acquisition of domestic firms. 22 Moreover, the
12. China Balance of Trade, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
china/balance-of-trade (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
13. China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, BBC (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321.
14. The World Factbook: China, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012); 2010 Statistical
Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2010), hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201109/ 1316069658609.pdf.
15. A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs, About the IMF, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G7.
16. UNCTADSTAT, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development available at
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). Refer to
Appendix I for calculations.
17. Id.; See also 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Table 1, (2010), hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/
accessory/ 201109/1316069658609.pdf.
18. UNCTADSTAT, supra note 16; OECD.StatExtracts, Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=FDI_
FLOW_PAR TNER# (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). Refer to Appendix II for calculations.
19. David Barboza, As China Invests, U.S. Could Lose, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011,
www.nytimes. com/2011/05/04/business/global/04yuan.html.
20. Id.
21. Barboza, supra note 19.
22. Derek Scissors, A Better committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/
enhancing-the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius.
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recent divestiture of private Chinese software company Huawei’s
acquisition of California-based company 3Leaf Systems is seen as
proof that politics still sway CFIUS’s review and creates an unfair
investment environment for Chinese firms despite modern regulatory
changes to the process. 23
Despite the contrary example above, Chinese aviation firm
AVIC International’s successful acquisition of the Alabama-based
aviation manufacturing firm Teledyne Continental in 2011 tells a
different story. 24 The fact that this acquisition was deemed to not
implicate national security, in spite of AVIC International being a
state-owned enterprise with ties to the Chinese government and in a
politically sensitive industry, suggests that the CFIUS review is not
politically hostile against all Chinese investors. 25 In particular, the
complete lack of Congressional interference with the proposed deal
indicates a departure from past political pressure on the CFIUS
process. Moreover, AVIC International’s success in contrast to
Huawei’s failure indicates that the Chinese party acquirer strategy is a
vital factor in minimizing potential political opposition and
influencing CFIUS’s stance.
The first part of this note will layout the legal framework of
CFIUS and the changes made to it by the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act, the implementing Executive Order, and the
relevant Treasury Regulation.
Next, a case study of AVIC
International will highlight how these regulatory changes have
reduced the level of political intervention in the CFIUS process. This
discussion will identify particular changes in CFIUS and its
procedures that disincentivize early response by Congress on such
transactions and opportunities for foreign investors to limit political
scrutiny. Additionally, this note will compare AVIC International
with Huawei and identify key strategic differences between the two
companies that greatly impacted their interaction with CFIUS and the
kind of political reaction to their investment. Finally, solutions to
remedy the poor perception of Chinese investors of the United
States’ CFIUS review will be offered, including the adoption of AVIC
International’s strategy by future Chinese investors and changes to
23. Chen Weihua, Pay the Lobbyists to Beat Double Standards, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 14,
2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-03/14/content_12164992.htm.
24. China’s AVIC International Completes US Acquisition Deal, CHINA DAILY USA
(Apr. 21, 2011), usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2011-04/21/content_12368667.htm; Teledyne
Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC International,
AVIATIONPROS.COM (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.aviationpros.com/press_release/10392512/
teledyne-technologies-agrees-to-sell-teledyne-continental-motors-to-avic-international.
25. See Edward Sun, Milbank Advises on First US Acquisition by Chinese Aviation
Company, MILBANK (May 16, 2011), http://www.milbank.com/news/milbank-advises-on-first-us-acquisition-by-chinese-aviation.html.
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the data in CFIUS’ annual report to Congress to include individual
country information in general and industry breakdowns.
II. THE ORIGINAL CFIUS: EXECUTIVE ORDERS, EXONFLORIO, AND THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE
CFIUS was established in 1975 by President Ford to help the
presidency determine national security risks associated with foreign
investment directed to the United States. 26 Executive Order 11858 27
set up the basic framework of CFIUS, establishing it as an interagency 28 Committee chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. 29
Executive Order 12661 30 provided general guidelines of CFIUS’s
responsibilities.
Executive Order 12661 tasked CFIUS with
determining whether particular transactions warranted investigation,
and if so, required CFIUS to conduct a 45-day investigation and
advise the President of its findings. 31
Under these Orders, the scope and authority of CFIUS was
extremely limited. Firstly, they lacked clear guidelines of what
constituted a national security interest that warranted investigation,
resulting in minimal voluntary reporting by foreign firms. Therefore,
CFIUS relied heavily on recommendations by the Department of
Defense as to what transactions to investigate. 32 Secondly, the limited
investigation timeframe of 45-days greatly limited the capability of
CFIUS in conducting thorough investigations. 33 Finally, the limited
power of the President to directly alter these foreign transactions,
through his power to declare a state of national emergency, similarly
limited the power of CFIUS because their investigative findings and
advice to the President had minimal actual consequences that could
affect such foreign transactions. 34
These shortcomings and increasing levels of foreign investment
that Congress believed to concern national security resulted in

26. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMM. ON
FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S.
1
(2010), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/
138611.pdf.
27. Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 7. 1975).
28. Exec. Order No. 11858, at §1.
29. Id.
30. Exec. Order No. 12661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27. 1988).
31. Exec. Order No. 12661, at §3-201(1)(A).
32. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 3.
33. Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 7, 1975).
34. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 4.
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Congress passing the Exon-Florio amendment in 1988. 35 Exon-Florio
authorizes the President to investigate any merger or acquisition of
United States companies by foreign persons that may result in shifting
control over to these foreign entities. 36 Additionally, it empowers the
President to block or divest any transaction where there is “credible
evidence” 37 that the transaction could “impair national security,” 38
but only if all other presidential authority to remedy such risk of
Moreover, the Treasury
impairment would not be feasible. 39
Department’s final regulation implementing the amendment
stipulates that the President can request an investigation of a
transaction that has not already been investigated at any time and
divest the transaction if warranted. 40 Though the President is given
this power, CFIUS implements the amendment as the designated
entity conducting the investigation into the national security
implications of the foreign transaction. 41
As a result, the CFIUS process was bolstered by the additional
direction contained within the amendment. The amendment directed
CFIUS to determine the effects of the transaction on the national
security of the United States by considering eleven specific areas of
This focused CFIUS’s
concern regarding national security. 42
investigation by providing a more concrete definition of national
security. Moreover, CFIUS is now instructed to conduct an initial 30day review, and if national security concerns are not addressed in that
This
time, may initiate an additional 45-day investigation. 43
additional time expanded CFIUS’s ability to conduct thorough
investigations. Most importantly, the President’s power to block or
divest a transaction greatly increased the power of CFIUS’s national
security determination. Thus, Exxon-Florio transformed CFIUS into
an administrative body “with a broad mandate and significant
authority to advise the President” and determine the outcome of
foreign investment in the United States. 44
In 1991, Congress provided even more direction to CFIUS

35. Leon G. Greenfield & Peter Lange, The CFIUS Process: A Primer, 6 THE THRESHOLD
10, 10 (Winter 2005/2006), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com.
36. Id.
37. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West 2007).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 5.
41. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170; Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 F.R. 779 (1988).
42. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170.
43. DAVID N. FAGAN, DELOITTE, THE U.S. REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR FDI 15 (2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%
20Assets/Documents/us_csg_ColumbiaFaganPaper_Chinese031809(3).pdf.
44. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 5.
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through the “Byrd Amendment” to Exon-Florio. 45 The Byrd
Amendment requires CFIUS to investigate proposed mergers,
acquisitions, or takeovers when the acquirer is controlled by or acting
on behalf of a foreign government and the acquisition may result in
control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United
States that could affect the national security of the country. 46 This
amendment added to the list of characteristics of what may constitute
a national security risk, and for the first time, it created a situation
where an investigation was mandatory.
This framework for the CFIUS review disproportionately
impacted Chinese investors. First, almost all of the Chinese investors
were state-owned enterprises often triggering a mandatory
investigation under the Byrd Amendment. Secondly, Chinese foreign
investment has typically focused on acquiring know-how and
technology, which implicates national security concerns under ExonFlorio. 47 Thus, Chinese investors looking to acquire U.S. firms would
almost certainly be subject to the CFIUS review. Chinese investors
felt this was unfair, because the regulations seemed to target their
investments and subject them to heightened CFIUS review. This
concern was further buttressed when, for the first and only time, the
Presidential divestiture power was exercised under Exon-Florio
against China Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation’s
acquisition of MAMCO Manufacturing Company. 48
Despite CFIUS’s increased ability to regulate foreign
acquisitions, Congress was still not satisfied with the process. First,
Congress was unhappy with the secrecy of CFIUS’s operations,
because the secrecy hampered Congress’s ability to assess the
thoroughness and accuracy of CFIUS’s investigations. 49 Moreover,
Congress believed that the current scope of CFIUS’s national security
analysis was too limited for modern day concerns. 50 This resulted in
significant changes to CFIUS and their investigation.

45. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 6.
46. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170.
47. Nargiza Salidjanova, GOING OUT: AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S OUTWAR FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 17 (Mar.
30, 2011), available at http://www.uscc.gov/Research/going-out-overview-china%
E2%
80%
99soutward-foreign-direct-investment.
48. Lawrence R. Fullerton, et al., Review of Foreign Acquisitions Under the Exon-Florio
Provision 151–52 (Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Working Papers, Nov. 25, 1992),
available at http://books.google.com.
49. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 2.
50. Id.
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III. THE NEW AND IMPROVED CFIUS: FINSA, EXECUTIVE
ORDER, AND TREASURY REGULATION
The Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) was
passed in 2007 to amend Exon-Florio and in January 2008 President
Bush issued Executive Order 13456 implementing the law. 51 Later
that year, the Treasury Department published regulatory guidelines
on FINSA and the amended CFIUS review. 52 Together, FINSA and
the Treasury regulations formalized CFIUS’s practice of informal
pre-notice review and mitigation agreements with foreign investors,
expanded the scope of national security issues, changed the
composition of CFIUS, and heightened CFIUS’s accountability to
Congress. 53
Prior to the passage of FINSA, CFIUS would entertain informal
reviews of proposed transactions. 54 These informal reviews gave
CFIUS more time to conduct their investigations by easing
compliance with the strict 30-day timeframe that commenced once
official notice is filed. 55 Though FINSA does not specifically allow
this practice, the Treasury Regulation encourages voluntary notice
and CFIUS, more specifically, expresses its preference for informal
review. 56 Thus, the lack of mention in FINSA for a specifically
required practice for review has helped establish the informal review
as a formalized step in the review process.
On the other hand, FINSA explicitly codifies CFIUS’s practice of
negotiating mitigation agreements with parties when there are initial
national security concerns. 57 Under the Act, CFIUS can “enter into,
or impose, and enforce” any condition in order to “mitigate any
threat to the national security of the United States that arise as a
result of the covered transaction.” 58 The act further requires CFIUS
to conduct a “risk-based analysis” before imposing any mitigating
conditions on the parties to the transaction. 59 This practice has
worked for the benefit of the parties, because it allows CFIUS to
approve of more transactions despite initial security concerns.
Moreover, in combination with the pre-notice informal review, many
51. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 2.
52. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign
Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008).
53. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 14.
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id.
56. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign
Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008).
57. Foreign Investment and National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2061 (2007).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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parties can implement these changes prior to the formal notice
ensuring an expeditious and successful outcome from the CFIUS
review process.
Besides retaining the key practices of CFIUS, FINSA was also a
response to perceived weaknesses in CFIUS’s analysis of national
security issues. 60 To address this concern, FINSA and the Executive
Order made various changes to the composition of CFIUS. The Act
officially added the Secretary of Homeland Security onto CFIUS as a
voting member, resulting in CFIUS having seven voting members,
including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Energy and Commerce, and the Attorney General. 61
The implementing Executive Order added five observing members—
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism—who have a duty to report to the
President under certain situations. 62 Additionally, the Order reserves
for the President the right to appoint any temporary member. These
changes to CFIUS provide a more comprehensive perspective as to
the economic and security consequences of the transactions.
Finally, FINSA requires extensive reporting requirements by
CFIUS to Congress in order to overcome the secrecy of its
investigations. Under FINSA CFIUS must provide an annual report
to Congress that includes information on “investment trends with
respect to types of investments, investors’ nationality, targeted sectors
of the United States industry, and practices adopted by foreign
acquirers.” 63 Moreover, CFIUS must notify Congress of each
transaction they investigate after CFIUS has concluded its review.
All these changes to CFIUS aimed to improve CFIUS’s
functioning to adequately protect Congress’s national security
concerns regarding foreign transaction. Ultimately, this increased
mandate on CFIUS to consider Congress’s concerns changed the
relationship between Congress and CFIUS by alleviating the need of
Congress to intervene in particular transactions. This essentially has

60. Edward L. Rubinoff & Tatman Ryder Savio, CFIUS Implements FINSA to ExonFlorio Foreign Investment Law, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 33, 33 (May
2008).
61. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 8.
62. Id. at 8–9.
63. Ronald A. Oleynik & Antonia I. Tzinova, CFIUS Reform Brings More Tansparency to
the Foreign Investment Review Process, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Oct. 1,
2007, at 5.
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given CFIUS more autonomy in their investigations, and has reduced
the political intervention in foreign transactions as evidenced by the
AVIC International deal.
IV. THE AVIC INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDY

A. Regulatory Changes Limiting Political Interference
In April of 2011, AVIC International completed its acquisition of
Teledyne Continental Motors’ general aviation piston engine
manufacturing business for $186 million. 64 AVIC International is the
international branch of China Aviation Industry Corporation
(“AVIC”). 65 AVIC is the modern incarnate of the China National
Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (“CATIC”), which
is associated with China’s Ministry of Aerospace Industry and is one
of China’s largest state-owned enterprises. 66 AVIC International
engaged in preotice review, filed a voluntary notice with CFIUS,
agreed to specific mitigating conditions, and was approved within the
30-day review period. 67
AVIC International’s experience with CFIUS was largely void of
direct political interference by Congress. This is a marked departure
from past Chinese acquisitions in sensitive industries, where it was
typical for Congress to directly intervene in the CFIUS review and
pressure foreign parties to withdraw their bid before a decision can be
rendered. For example, in 2005, China’s National Offshore Oil
Corporation (“CNOOC”) bid to acquire United States oil company
Unocal. 68 Within days of the offer, members of Congress expressed
their fears that CFIUS would approve a CNOOC-Unocal deal
because their narrow mandate would not be capable of a full
This resulted in the House of
assessment of the risks. 69
64. Teledyne Completes Sale of its Piston Engine Business, BUSINESSWIRE (Apr. 19, 2011),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110419007015/en/Teledyne-Completes-Sale-PistonEngine-Business.
65. AVIC INTERNATIONAL, www.avic-intl.cn/avicIntl/home/index.do?cmd=goToChannel
&cid=328, (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
66. Id.
67. Sun, supra note 25; Charles A. Hunnicutt, $2 Million deal = Big CFIUS Mistake,
TROUTMAN SANDERS (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.troutmansanders.com/2-million-deal--bigcfius-mistake-03-07-2011/.
68. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, YEE WONG & KETKI SHETH, US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES:
RISING TIDES, RISING STAKES 47 (2006), available at http://www.piie.com/publications/
chapters_preview /3942/05iie3942.pdf.
69. Hufbauer, supra note 68, at 47.
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Representative passing various bills to delay the CFIUS review
process. 70 Since there was no guarantee CFIUS would approve the
acquisition, the delay made the acquisition too risky and expensive
for CNOOC causing CNOOC to withdraw its bid. 71 The next year, a
study by the Department of Energy found that China’s national oil
companies were not a threat to the United States economy and
suggested that if CFIUS completed an investigation, the Department
of Energy may have approved the deal. 72 Thus, Congress’s political
concerns broke up a potentially valid foreign acquisition.
AVIC International’s experience indicates a departure from this
kind of meddling relationship between Congress and CFIUS
considering the fact that the deal was approved without petitioning by
Congress members. This change can be traced to the regulatory
changes to CFIUS through FINSA and the implementing Executive
Order. These changes effectively safeguarded against Congress’s
concerns with CFIUS’s process, thus reducing the need for direct
intervention into CFIUS’s review.
One of FINSA’s main accomplishments was formalizing CFIUS’s
practice of informal prenotice review and mitigation agreements. 73
Formalizing these two practices gave foreign investors a way to begin
the process without attracting the attention of Congress and
disincentivized Congressional interference during CFIUS’s review.
Investors can use the prenotice informal review prior to even a formal
bid for acquisition or merger. 74 This is extremely beneficial for all
investors because it allows the investor to get a review and feedback
from CFIUS prior to any media or political backlash to the potential
deal. Investors such as AVIC International are increasingly using this
option to better situate their company and the details of the
acquisition before formal notice. 75 Thus, this prenotice review allows
foreign investors to escape early political opposition that may
undermine a deal that may not have real security implications upon
further investigation.
Additionally, formalizing the mitigation capabilities of CFIUS
greatly reduces Congress’s incentive to intervene prior to a complete
CFIUS review. FINSA established a broad power of CFIUS to not
70. Hufbauer, supra note 68, at 48.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 50.
73. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign
Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,572 (Dec. 8, 2008).
74. Amy E. Worlton, John Reynolds & Cari Stinebower, New CFIUS Rules Largely Codify
Existing Practice, Including Increased Scrutiny, WILEY REIN (Apr. 2008), www.wileyrein.com/
PUBLICATIONS.CFM?SP=ARTICLES&ID=707.
75. Leon G. Greenfield & Peter Lange, The CFIUS Process: A Primer, The Threshold —
The Newsletter of the Mergers & Acquisitions Comm., Vol. VI Issue 1 at 13.
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only suggest but also force certain conditions onto a foreign investor
in order to mitigate national security concerns. 76 This process
essentially obviates the need for Congress to intervene during the
investigation because the mitigation agreement may completely
eliminate the concern. AVIC International agreed to a long list of
mitigating conditions including promises to retain manufacturing in
Alabama, expand the manufacturing facility, and retain local
employees. 77 This effectively addressed the key political concern of a
foreign takeover of a major employer in Alabama, eliminating the
need for Congressional interference. 78 Thus, formalizing mitigation
agreements delays political intervention into the CFIUS investigation,
and allows CFIUS to complete their initial review independently.
FINSA and the Executive Order’s changes to the composition of
CFIUS has expanded the perspectives represented in CFIUS. In
particular, adding members whose focus is national security rather
than economic has instilled greater Congressional trust in CFIUS’s
investigation and recommendations. 79 Prior to FINSA, members of
Congress had expressed concerns for the motivations of the Treasury
and Commerce Secretaries. 80 Though the Secretaries were tasked to
consider national security concerns as members of CFIUS, the
departments they represent are generally pro-investment. 81 Thus,
Congress often was not confident that reviews primarily conducted by
either Secretary would give enough weight to security issues. 82
Congress’s confidence in the review was improved by adding the
Secretary of Homeland Security as well as five observing members to
balance the pool of perspectives in CFIUS; this reduced Congress’s
motivation to interfere.
Moreover, the required reporting requirements have relaxed the
extent of direct Congressional intervention in CFIUS’s practices and
investigations. 83 The requirement that CFIUS must inform Congress
of every transaction after it conducts its investigation ensures that
Congress is aware of every potential deal. 84 This essentially reduces
Congress’s scrutiny of proposed mergers and acquisitions it comes
76. 50 U.S.C.A § 2170 (West 2012).
77. Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC
International, supra note 24.
78. Id.
79. Alan P. Larson & David M. Marchick, Foreign Investment and National Security:
Getting the Right Balance, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 13 (July 18, 2006),
i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CFIUSreport.pdf.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 50 U.S.C. § 2061 (West 2007).
84. 50 U.S.C. § 2061.
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across in the media, because Congress can rely on CFIUS notifying
them with sufficient time to act if Congress sees fit. As in the case of
AVIC International, the company had already begun discussions with
CFIUS prior to any media publication of the proposed deal, allowing
for an objective review by CFIUS. 85 This is especially beneficial for
Chinese investors with initial security issues, because they have time
to work out those issues before Congress examines the deal, unlike
the CNOOC incident where Congress intervened beforehand.
However, Huawei critics argue that CFIUS’s review is still
subject to political interference as evidenced by the petitioning by
Congressional members for CFIUS to review Huawei’s acquisition
and their accusations that Huawei was connected to the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). 86 Huawei does present a more politically
active situation than AVIC International. However, Congress’s
petitioning only resulted in CFIUS requiring Huawei to file a notice
for investigation. 87 CFIUS was able to complete their investigation
without being delayed or otherwise obstructed by Congress and
individually determined there was a national security issue. 88 Thus,
even Huawei’s experience indicates that FINSA and the Executive
Order has successfully minimized political intervention into CFIUS’s
review.
However, one might argue that the political intervention by
Congress has merely changed form, from directly interfering with
CFIUS, to covertly interfering by influencing CFIUS’s decision itself.
This argument is supported if Huawei’s contention that it does not
have any connection with the PLA is true, since CFIUS’s national
security analysis seems to rest on this issue. 89 However, many sources
confirm that Huawei’s ownership structure is very opaque making it
difficult to definitively dispel its purported connection with the
PLA. 90 Thus, CFIUS’s decision was ultimately based on existing
national security concerns rather than Congressional pressure for a
particular outcome.
Huawei does have an argument that the accusation by Congress
85. Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC
International, supra note 24.
86. Dan Ikenson, Despite Huawei’s Experience America is Increasingly Open to Chinese
Investment, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/02/23/despite-

huaweis-experience-america-is-increasingly-open-to-chinese-investment/.
87. Id.
88. Ikenson, supra note 86.
89. Paul Weiss, Huawei Resists CFIUS Demand to Divest U.S. Technology Firm,
CURRENT TELECOM DEVELOPMENTS (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.paulweiss.com/files/
Publication/727b4a08-a98c-4610-a01f-7f8fb2af2f29/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1f71cd
47-3459-47f6-bd74-80492f937953/CTD2-18-11.pdf.
90. Ikenson, supra note 86.
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tainted the overall CFIUS review and subjected Huawei to
heightened scrutiny by CFIUS. Essentially, if Congress never said
that it believed that Huawei was connected to the PLA, when CFIUS
reviewed Huawei’s ownership structure the fact there was no clear
indication of a connection would have been enough. Instead, CFIUS
had to disprove the connection. This may be true, and the regulatory
changes are not equipped to deter this kind of interference by
Congress. However, this kind of bias from statements by political
leaders on the CFIUS review is not inherent in the process as evident
by the AVIC International deal. In fact, AVIC International suggests
that even this form of subtle political influence on CFIUS can be
avoided by key strategic choices by the Chinese investor.

B. Chinese Investor Strategy
AVIC International’s success in contrast to Huawei’s failure is
extremely significant. Both companies have ties to the Chinese
government 91 and both tried to acquire businesses in key industries of
importance to national security, 92 suggesting that the reason for a
particular CFIUS decision under such conditions does not rest on a
general bias against Chinese government affiliated companies.
Instead, a close examination of AVIC International’s approach to the
investment compared to Huawei indicates that the Chinese investor’s
strategy is a vital factor in the CFIUS review.
A key difference between AVIC International’s and Huawei’s
strategies was the fact that AVIC International voluntarily filed with
CFIUS while Huawei only filed after it was asked by CFIUS to do
so. 93 This was a major misstep for Huawei because it raised suspicion
within CFIUS before the review even began. CFIUS not only
inferred from the lack of notice that Huawei was trying to avoid
review, 94 but also looked at the small dollar amount of the deal ($20
million) as another deliberate action by Huawei to complete the
acquisition under CFIUS’s radar. 95 Thus, not voluntarily filing with
CFIUS is looked at as a red flag to scrutinize the transaction more
closely to determine whether the investor was trying to avoid
91. Ikenson, supra note 86; AVIC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65.
92. AVIC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65.
93. Ikenson, supra note 86; Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental
Motors to AVIC International, supra note 24.
94. Scott M. Flicker & Dana M. Parsons, Huawei-CFIUS Redux: Now It Gets Interesting,
PAUL HASTINGS STAY CURRENT (Mar. 2011), www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/
1868.pdf.
95. Ikenson, supra note 86.
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CFIUS’s review because of an existing national security issue.
Huawei advisors stated that they avoided filing notice, because
Huawei had been implicated by the United States government in
previous transactions as having a connection with the Chinese
military. In 2010, Huawei’s attempted joint deal to buy out United
States telecommunications company SprintNextel was heavily
opposed by members of Congress due to the belief that Huawei had
ties to the PLA and access to SprintNextel’s network would leave
Huawei
U.S. airwaves vulnerable to military interceptions. 96
adamantly denied such association. However, the opposition from
Congress pressured Huawei to withdraw its bid prior to a complete
CFIUS review. 97 Huawei stated that it believed it would be unfairly
treated if it notified CFIUS as in the SprintNextel deal and structured
the deal merely to avoid that bias. 98 However, AVIC International
also has had a troubled history with CFIUS. Thus its current success
indicates that past behavior does not necessarily prejudice the present
analysis by CFIUS.
AVIC’s old alias CATIC, tried to acquire MAMCO in 1990. 99
The transaction was subject to CFIUS review because the technology
purchased may have had military applications. 100 CFIUS ultimately
recommended to the President to divest the company, due to
CATIC’s prior violations of United States export regulations for
purchasing prohibited materials for the Chinese military and
CATIC’s association with the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace
Industry. 101 CATIC’s past history with CFIUS is very similar to the
issues Huawei faced in the SprintNextel deal, but AVIC
International’s voluntary notice did not suffer due to this. Rather, the
voluntary notice led to a thorough investigation, which found a very
different organization that did not implicate national security
concerns. 102 Thus, Huawei’s strategy of non-notice to avoid bias does
not seem necessary because AVIC International shows that CFIUS is
able to move on from past indiscretions provided that the
investigation warrants such a result.
Huawei’s argument may have more force if one considers the
96.
97.
98.
99.

Weiss, supra note 89.

Id.

Flicker & Parsons, supra note 94.
Lawrence R. Fullerton et al., Review of Foreign Acquisitions Under the Exon-Florio
Provision 151 (Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Working Papers, Nov. 25, 1992),
available at http://books.google.com.
100. Id. at 151.
101. Id. at 151–52.
102. Dara A. Panahy & Li Chen, CFIUS Challenges for China Companies Investing in the
US, MILBANK, http://transasialawyers.com/publicfiles/N2-Milbank-E.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2012).
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timeframe between each company’s prior unsuccessful interaction
with CFIUS and the current transaction. More than twenty years
passed between AVIC International’s transactions, while only about
one year passed between Huawei’s transactions. This suggests that
the length of time between transactions allowed for the bias to
subside against AVIC International while the short time between
transactions means that even if Huawei voluntarily notified CFIUS
the bias would have still impacted the decision. This argument
definitely has support, because the press surrounding AVIC
International’s acquisition did not mention the company’s past as
CATIC. Also, the mitigating conditions to the deal focused on
domestic labor issues rather technology privacy, indicating that
CFIUS was not concerned that AVIC International would repeat
those practices. 103 Despite the strength of this argument, Huawei’s
strategy still failed, because the lack of notice ultimately exacerbated
the bias. Huawei’s action of completing an acquisition in an industry
with similar national security concerns as the SprintNextel deal so
soon after without notice was a signal to CFIUS that those concerns
still exist warranting an investigation. 104 Thus, the potential existence
of bias is a reason to voluntarily notify CFIUS in order to challenge
that preconceived belief against the foreign investor.
Another key difference between AVIC International’s and
Huawei’s strategy is that AVIC International took substantial steps to
change its image between the CATIC-MAMCO divestiture and the
Teledyne acquisition. CATIC was criticized for purportedly buying
engines for business purposes but in fact giving it to the Chinese
military to reverse engineer. 105 Thus, the main security concern with
CATIC at the time of the MAMCO deal was that it was connected
with the Chinese military and its business dealings were not purely
economically motivated. Since then, AVIC International changed its
business structure, established itself as an internationally competitive
company, and has worked on its reputation within the aviation
industry. These changes shifted the dynamics of this company’s
interaction with the United States government undermining the
government’s ability to lodge its old opposition to the current
investment.
In 2008, after the CATIC-MAMCO incident, CATIC changed its
corporate structure. 106 AVIC and AVIC International were created
103. Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC
International, supra note 24.
104. Ikenson, supra note 86.

105. LAWRENCE R. FULLERTON & CHRISTOPHER G. GRINER, REVIEW OF FOREIGN
ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE EXON-FLORIO PROVISION 150–51 (1992).
106. AVIC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65.
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as equal shareholders of CATIC. 107 The military arms trade business
was separated out from AVIC and AVIC International as CATIC’s
sole practice. 108 This structural change created a degree of separation
between AVIC International’s business practice from its past military
dealing, essentially diluting the potential government influence on the
company’s foreign business activities. AVIC International still holds
a 50 percent stake in CATIC and its military arms business, 109 so it is
not void of a connection to the Chinese military; however, this
restructuring goes a long way to clarify the relationship and create
transparency in AVIC International’s business dealings.
Additionally, AVIC International became an international
player in the aviation industry by aggressively expanding its presence
and network of trade partners across the world. AVIC International
company motto is to “build up a multinational corporation with
international competiveness.” 110 Since 2008, AVIC International has
established over 60 overseas branches in over 30 countries and has
clients in over 180 countries. 111 Moreover, AVIC International has
been on the Fortune 500 list since 2009. 112 All these factors indicate
the company’s commitment to the international economy and the
furtherance of their business, thus shifting the presumption that the
company has ulterior motives to one that is market-driven.
Finally, AVIC International has established a solid reputation
within the aviation industry as a company with quality aviation
products and as a successful exporter. This is reinforced by the fact
that Teledyne completed the deal with AVIC International because
they were confident AVIC International would help Teledyne expand
internationally and make it competitive in the modern market. 113
Additionally, AVIC International has contracts with the leading firms
in the business, including a long-standing supply relationship with
Boeing and technological and manufacturing partnerships with
Hamilton Sundstrand and Safran. 114 By establishing itself as a key
player within the aviation industry, AVIC International repositions
itself from being a major Chinese state-owned aviation company to
107. AVIC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Xin Dingding, Aerospace Firm AVIC in Fortune Rank List, CHINA DAILY (July 10,
2009), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-07/10/content_8406574.htm.
113. Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC
International, supra note 24.
114. Jon Grevatt, Paris Air Show 2011: AVIC Expands International Partnerships, IHS
(June 21, 2011), http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-securityreport.aspx?id= 106592
9845.
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being a major aviation company, period. Together, these changes to
AVIC International’s business structure and practices undermines
Congress’s ability to influence CFIUS’s review with past security
concerns, further insulating the deal from political intervention.
Huawei by contrast, did not take any remedial steps to address
the concerns Congress lodged against its earlier deal with
SprintNextel before acquiring 3Leaf Systems. This allowed Congress
to reassert its previous concerns regarding Huawei, inciting CFIUS to
review the transaction. Congress’s concerns ultimately were the basis
of CFIUS’s recommendation to divest. Huawei could have limited
the influence of past security concerns by taking bona fide measures
to weaken Congress ability to use the same argument against their
future investments. In particular, AVIC International’s structural
change is instructive for Huawei as a viable option to dispel fears of
its connection with the PLA.
However, Huawei might argue that the changes AVIC
International undertook were not the reasons for the lack of political
opposition, since Huawei is also a multinational corporation, on the
Fortune 500 list, the second largest telecommunications company in
the world, and in fact is a private business as opposed to a stateowned enterprise, and yet was still not successful under CFIUS’s
review. 115 These similarities between AVIC International and
Huawei are poignant and do indicate these characteristics alone are
not enough to change political perception of a Chinese investor.
However, Huawei assumed all these characteristics by the time of the
SprintNextel acquisition and not between the SprintNextel deal and
3Leaf Systems deal. 116 This reinforces AVIC International’s strategy
that the key tactic in limiting past political opposition is to engage in
substantive changes between the negative review and the present
deal.
Overall, AVIC International’s success indicates that CFIUS is to
Chinese investors. More importantly, AVIC International has laid a
roadmap of how Chinese investors can steer their interaction with
CFIUS in a positive direction. Through strategic choices such as
using the pre-notice informal review and taking steps to challenge the
ability of Congress to pose political opposition, Chinese investors
have the power to set themselves up for a speedy and successful
CFIUS review despite past problems with CFIUS.

115. Sheridan Prasso, What Makes China Telecom Huawei so Scary?, CNNMONEY (July 28,
2011), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/07/28/what-makes-china-telecom-huawei-so-scary/.
116. Id.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
AVIC International’s successful acquisition of Teledyne
indicates that the CFIUS process is not necessarily hostile to Chinese
investors. AVIC International’s overall approach to the CFIUS
review, specifically using FINSA’s pre-notice review and mitigation
agreement and voluntarily filing with CFIUS was vital to its success.
Other Chinese investors looking to merge with or acquire United
States’ companies should adopt this approach. The pre-notice review
and implementation of suggested mitigation prepares the deal
substantively for a successful formal CFIUS review, while voluntary
notification insulates the deal from political interference. This overall
strategy changes the dynamics of the CFIUS process to one where the
Chinese party has more control over the outcome of the deal.
Therefore, Chinese investors are advised to follow AVIC
International’s strategy in order to ensure a hospitable investment
environment in the United States.
However, AVIC International also highlights the disparity
between the perception and reality of Chinese foreign investment in
the United States. AVIC International depicts a much friendlier
environment for Chinese investors than the popular examples of
Chinese experiences in the United States such as CNOOC and
Huawei. Unfortunately, the success of AVIC International and its
strategy may not be enough to change the perception of Chinese
investors, since it is only one instance of success against many
instances of failed CFIUS review. This is a problem for the future
growth of Chinese FDI because the negative perception is enough to
deter investment. 117
There are many options to change this negative perception. For
one, CFIUS itself can be a powerful agent for change. In particular,
CFIUS can release information regarding the number of notifications,
withdrawals, approvals, and divestitures of Chinese investors each
year. This could easily be done as part of CFIUS’s annual report to
Congress, which is made publically available. Currently the report
already provides statistics in each of these categories based on region,
China being in the East Asia category. 118 However, it is difficult to
extrapolate from those numbers, since multiple countries are grouped
together, and it is difficult to find comprehensive information of those
117. Sheridan Prasso, Chinese Investors Still Searching for U.S. Welcome Mat, CNNMONEY
(May 4, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/04/news/international/chinese_investo
rs_america.fortune/index.htm.
118. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 29 (Dec. 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreigninvestment/Do cuments/2011%
20CFIUS%
20Annual%
20Report%
20FINAL%
20PUBLIC.pdf.
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countries investment histories. Therefore, it is near impossible to
discern what proportion of each category represents Chinese
investors. By breaking down the numbers by country, CFIUS will
give an accurate picture of CFIUS’s treatment of Chinese investors.
Releasing this information could possibly change Chinese investors’
perception of, and ultimately encourage greater, investing in the
United States.
Moreover, by releasing the information, CFIUS could also
implicitly impact its own behavior in favor of Chinese investors.
CFIUS has an interest in being seen as a legitimate authority in
determining national security issues with foreign transactions. Thus,
publishing the numbers by country may provide an incentive in
CFIUS to be more discerning when they recommend divestiture so
that they can defend those numbers with authority. Thus, releasing
country data, can initiate self-policing within CFIUS to limit political
influence on their decisions.
CFIUS can also break down individual country information into
industries. Chinese investors have expressed their hesitancy to invest
after the Huawei incident despite not being in the technology
industry. 119 This is because there is an overall perception of hostility
towards Chinese investors. Currently the report aggregates regional
data in nine industries. 120 However, if the report broke down the
information on an industry-by-industry level, Chinese investors can
determine whether they are in an industry that may have better
results with CFIUS, rather than being discouraged by failed deals of
companies in different industries.
Information is the key to changing perception. Not only does the
information itself present objective data for Chinese investors to
accurately ascertain the investment environment in the United States,
but it is also a step towards greater transparency. This gesture of
goodwill on the part of CFIUS, to allow itself to be accountable to
individual country investors, could encourage Chinese investors
regardless of what the data indicates.
VII. CONCLUSION
AVIC International’s successful CFIUS review is a clear example
of how key regulatory changes to CFIUS’s power has created a
process that minimizes political interference and maximizes a Chinese
119. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 118.
120. Id.
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investor’s chance for a successful CFIUS review. Moreover, AVIC
International’s strategy of voluntarily notifying CFIUS allayed
political backlash to the deal. Therefore, Chinese investors should not
be deterred from investing in the United States, but should follow the
AVIC International model other Chinese to navigate the CFIUS
process successfully. However, as the United States continues to
encourage foreign investment to stimulate growth, it will also be
important for CFIUS to dispel the perception among Chinese
investors that it is difficult to invest in the United States. CFIUS
should include country-by-country data in their annual report on
general investment categories so that Chinese investors can
objectively evaluate CFIUS’s treatment of Chinese investors.
Moreover, CFIUS should include an industry breakdown for each
country, and indicate the approval rates for each industry. This will
help create a more nuanced appreciation for CFIUS’s decisions and
help avoid broad deterrence in industries CFIUS is not particularly
concerned with.
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Appendix I
Country
G7 Nations
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
G7 Nations Average
China

2010 Total FDI
Outflow (Billions
U.S. Dollar)

FDI Output % of GDP

38.585
76.867
109.321
32.655
56.263
39.502
304.399

2.45%
3.00%
3.33%
1.59%
1.03%
1.75%
2.09%
2.18%

68.811

1.20%

Appendix II
Country

Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United
Kingdom

2010 FDI
Outflow to
U.S. (Billions
U.S. Dollar)
5.522
9.336
17.362
1.326
17.612
23.931

2010 Total FDI
Outflow
(Billions U.S.
Dollar)
38.585
76.867
109.321
32.655
56.263
39.502

U.S. FDI % of
Total FDI
Outflow
13.534%
12.146%
15.882%
4.061%
31.308%
60.582%

